Deep Learning has become a de-facto paradigm for various prediction problems including many privacy-preserving applications, where the privacy of data is a serious concern. There have been efforts to analyze and exploit information leakages from DNN to compromise data privacy. In this paper, we provide an evaluation strategy for such information leakages through DNN by considering a case study on CNN classifier. The approach utilizes low-level hardware information provided by Hardware Performance Counters and hypothesis testing during the execution of a CNN to produce alarms if there exists any information leakage on actual input.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, we have seen an outburst of deep learning research in both industry and academia, as it considerably outperforms prior machine learning based techniques in a wide variety of domains, such as image recognition, machine translation, etc. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) is recently being used for many privacy-preserving applications like medical image analysis, in which data privacy of any user requires utmost attention. There have been recent attempts of reverse engineering and retrieval of the parameters of Deep Neural Network (DNN) by side-channel information [2, 4] to compromise privacy. Wei et al. [3] presented an approach to determine input image of an FPGA-based CNN implementation by observing power side-channel. The growing efforts to reverse engineer CNN inputs directly hamper the privacy of users leading to severe issues, like discrimination, safety violations, etc. Moreover, it could lead to substantial economic losses for companies if such private data, which is used to train CNNs, is * We would like to acknowledge Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd. and TCG Foundation for partially supporting the research through the grant "Cyber Security Research in CPS". Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. revealed to other parties, which may include competitors. Hence, in this paper, we pursue to develop an evaluation strategy for such divulging of DNN inputs. The target scenario in our approach is when a CNN is executing on a standard desktop, and the evaluator is expected to perform a dynamic analysis and throw alarms when it detects possibilities of such leakages when the CNN classifies its inputs. The tool that the evaluator employs for this detection is a set of registers which are called Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs), present in most computing platforms, ranging from workstations to embedded processors. The data acquired from HPCs are run-time monitored by the evaluator, which computes t-statistics of the data to notify whether the ongoing CNN classifier is emanating side-channel information which is significant for adversaries to be able to determine the inputs even treating the CNN as a black-box. Contribution: We strive to provide an evaluation strategy to measure private information leakages, i.e., actual input to the DNN architecture, during its prediction operation using readily available HPCs and basic hypothesis testing methodology, which to the best of our knowledge has not been attempted so far. Motivation: Execution of DNN classifier consists of a series of multiplication and addition operations on the computing environment (i.e., CPUs or GPUs). In this work, we focus on CPU implementation of an image classifier based on CNN. It is a well-established fact that the execution of any process on CPU leaks valuable side-channel information through processor cache, branch predictor unit and other low-level hardware activities [1] . The motivation behind this work is to explore the possibility of private information leakages in terms of these hardware events during classification operation of a CNN before deploying it in a large-scale application.
To demonstrate the idea of information leakage we consider two image datasets MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our main speculation from these datasets is that the effect of CNN operations on hardware activities will be different for different categories, as the images belonging to a particular class activates a specific set of neuron in the CNN, which might not get activated for other images belonging to a different class. The activation and inactivation of these neurons influence CNN operation affecting CPU cache, branch predictor and other units differently for different categories. To support the claim, we monitor the average number of cache-misses for both dataset while classifying each category through a CNN and present the result in Fig. 1 . The figure shows that the average number of cache-misses is different for different categories showing a possible venue for information leakage which depends on the input. This observation motivates to use the information provided by low-level hardware events to develop our evaluation framework.
METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION
Consider a scenario where a CNN, trained on private information, is executed in a computing environment as shown in Fig. 2(a) . A group of User can access this CNN to get predictions on their respective inputs. Let us also consider an Evaluator who is not provided with any details of the CNN but can dynamically monitor HPCs during its execution using its process id and perf tool. The Evaluator can only get information as shown in Fig. 2(b) , which indicates a quantitative value for different hardware events in a single classification operation. The evaluator, having admin privilege, can be employed to observe HPC events for different category of images. Operations of the evaluator are: (a) It monitors various HPC events in parallel during classification operation of different category of input images, considering each category individually. Thus, resulting in distributions of different events for each class of inputs. (b) It employs a hypothesis testing methodology by computing t-statistics on the distributions of same HPC events for different categories.
The evaluator raises an alarm if the null hypothesis is rejected, which signifies that the distributions are different. If distributions of an HPC event for different inputs are not distinguishable, we say that an adversary will not be able to exploit this side-channel information to uncover private input images, thus indicating an efficient implementation of the CNN model.
RESULTS

Experimental Setup:
We implemented two CNNs for MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset using tensorflow library for our evaluation. We executed the CNNs in Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPU having Ubuntu 18.04 with a 4.15.0-36-generic kernel. All hardware related activities are measured using perf tool as mentioned previously.
Case Study on MNIST:
We monitored different HPC events during the prediction of each category for MNIST dataset. We observed that some events can produce different distributions for different categories. Distributions of events cache-misses and branches for all test images belonging to different categories are shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) respectively. If we apply t-test on distributions shown in Fig. 3(a) , we can easily distinguish them. The t and p values for the tests are shown in Fig. 3 (c) and Fig. 3(d) respectively. Results of t-tests for these distributions are shown in Table 1 (b). In this case also we can distinguish between all distributions if we consider cache-misses, and distributions of category 1 and 3 can be distinguished using branches. This triggers the evaluator to raise an alarm about the information leakage related to the input image.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a strategy to evaluate the data privacy of DNN architectures with readily available tools. We took the aid of low-level HPC events and t-test in designing the evaluation strategy. We presented the result based on a CNN based image classifier on two publicly available datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our evaluation tool highlights the need for designing CNN architectures with indistinguishable CPU footprints while classifying different image categories in order to implement a privacy preserving classifier.
